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LAWLESS LAW?
THE SUBVERSION OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Ellen J. Dannin & Tel-y H. Wagar'*
I. INTRODUCTION
Why is it that since the mid-1950s United States union density
has declined from about 30% to its current level of 1 I% to 15%?'
We know the decline has not affected all groups. Public sector union
membership has risen while unionization in the private sector has
plummeted: nearly 38% of government workers were union mem-
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fornia. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Michigan. An earlier
version of this paper was delivered at the 1999 Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting in Chicago. The authors would like to thank Gary Chaison,
Catherine Fisk, James Gross, Tom Juravich, Jim Rundle, and Kirsten Snow
Spalding for their comments and Clive Gilson for his assistance in designing
the study. Thanks to student assistants Roger "Skip" Ritchie, Jan Selberg, and
Matthew Miller.
** Professor of Industrial Relations, Department of Management, St.
Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. LL.B., University of Ottawa; Ph.D.,
Virginia Tech.
1. See Daniel J.B. Mitchell, A Decade of Concession Bargaining, in
LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS 435, 440 (Clark Kerr & Paul D. Staudohar eds., 1994); Joel
Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., How Do Labor and Management View Collective
Bargaining?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1998, at 23, 23. Some variation oc-
curs based on whether only private sector or public and private sector union
members are included. See MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATrER 107
(1998) (public and private sector); Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who
Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13,
13 (Bruce E. Kaufiman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (private sector); see
also Gary N. Chaison & Joseph B. Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union
Growth and Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 3, 3 (George Strauss et al.
eds., 1991).
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bers in 1998 compared to only 10% of private nonagricultural work-
ers.2 Furthermore, not all private sector workers have faced declines:
organization in the railway and airline industries remain high.3
The thing that distinguishes these groups, and thus might ac-
count for the differences, is the law under which their respective un-
ion membership is organized. The rights of state public sector work-
ers' to organize are covered by state law; federal public sector
workers are covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Re-
lations Act;4 the Railway Labor Act covers private sector railway and
airline workers;5 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) con-
trols collective bargaining rights for most private sector employees.6
Those who have attempted to find differences in the law to explain
the decline in private sector union membership have limited their ex-
amination to differences in union election processes or have pre-
ferred nonlegal causes such as economics, employee choice, and em-
ployer opposition.
We contend that the court-developed doctrine which allows an
employer to implement its final offer upon reaching an impasse has
now become a tool for lawlessness and this important explanation for
the decline of union density has been unwisely ignored and over-
looked.8 There are but a few law review articles that examine im-
2. See Union Members: Who They Are, Where They Work, and What They
Earn, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1996, at 42, 42 (same figures for 1995).
Public sector employers show less opposition to union organizing campaigns.
See KATE BRONFENBRENNER & TOM JURAVICH, UNION TACTICS MATTER:
THE IMPACT OF UNION TACTICS ON CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS, FIRST
CONTRACTS AND MEMBERSHIP RATES.
3. See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union
Activity Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 317,
320 (1998).
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7106 (1996).
5. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994). For a recent comparison of the
NLRA and RLA, see Morris, supra note 3.
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
7. See, e.g., THOMAS KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 109-77 (1994); Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al.,
supra note 1, at 25-27. But see Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the
Labor Movement, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575 (1997) (blaming the decline in un-
ion membership on both legal and nonlegal forces).
8. Industrial relations literature generally overlooks or even fhils to men-
tion impasse and implementation. See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 7. An
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plementation upon impasse. 9 Implementation upon impasse not only
allows employers to undermine the very purposes for which the
NLRA was enacted, it actually creates an incentive for employers to
use the law as a tool to de-unionize. An analysis of data collected
fromNational Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "Board") decisions
provides powerful support for the conclusion that employers are us-
ing this doctrine to create roadblocks to agreement and to end col-
lective bargaining relationships. As a result, a law enacted to pro-
mote collective bargaining has, instead, become one which destroys
collective bargaining.
The evidence of this is everywhere; yet somehow it remains in-
visible. Implementation is not an obscure or rare event. Rather, it
has become common and has played a part in high-profile labor dis-
putes that have made headlines, including disputes at Caterpillar,'0
the Detroit News," the National Football League,'2 the baseball
example of this can be found in RICHARD BLOCK ET AL., LABOR LAN,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYEE CHOICE: THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE 1990s, at 88-93 (1996). The authors recount an incident
in which an employer implemented its final offer and replaced all strikers. The
authors, however, failed to discuss the role the employer's power to implement
its final offer played in events which weakened the union. But see MICHAEL
YATES, POWER ON THE JOB: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WORKING PEOPLE 121-26
(1994); YATES, supra note 1, at 69-71; Adrienne Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Collec-
tive Bargaining in the Paper Industy: Developments Since 1979, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 25, 44-49
(Paula Voos ed., 1994).
9. See, e.g., Ellen J. Dannin, Collective Bargaining, Impasse and the Im-
plementation of Final Offers: Have We Created a Right Unaccompanied by
Fulfillment, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 41 (1987) [hereinafter Dannin, Collective Bar-
gaining] (examining the historical development of the doctrine); Ellen J. Dan-
nin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National La-
bor Relations Act and the Emploqyment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 917 (1996); Ellen J. Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution
Under the National Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter?, 15 HOFsTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 11 (1997) [hereinafter Dannin, Legislative Intent]; Clive Gil-
son et al., Collective Bargaining Theory and the Doctrine of Implementation of
Final Offers Collide, 48 LAB. L.J. 587 (1997); Joseph E. Kolick, Jr. & Merle
M. DeLancey, Jr., Can One Unilaterally Gain the Right to Make Unilateral
Changes in Working Conditions?, 9 LAB. LAW. 137 (1993); Terrence H. Mur-
phy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 1
(1977).
10. See Caterpillar, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 201 (1997).
11. See Detroit News, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 262 (1995).
12. See Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.RIB. 78 (1992).
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players' strike, 13 and International Paper.' 4
Furthermore, the destructive role implementation upon impasse
plays should not have gone unnoticed for lack of its importance as
measured in dollars. Even in less publicized cases, its impact on em-
ployers, workers, and the government, can be sizeable. The recent
Board case of Don Lee Distributor, Inc. (Warren)15 demonstrates its
economic impact. Don Lee Distributor involved ten consolidated
cases filed over a period of two years, beginning in 1990.16 The
hearing was held in Detroit, Michigan and lasted sixty nonconsecu-
tive days from November 16, 1992, to October 26, 1993.17 More
13. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc.,
67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
14. See Int'l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1995); see also JuLIUs
GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, &
PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998) (recounting the story of the seventeen-
month strike by Local 14 of the United Paperworkers International Union
against International Paper beginning in June 1987 and ending in October
1988).
15. 322 N.L.R.B. 470 (1996), affd sub nom., Don Lee Distrib. Inc. (War-
ren) v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102
(1999). A discussion of the facts of the case can be found in Dannin, Legisla-
tive Intent, supra note 9, at 14-20.
16. See Don Lee Distrib., 322 N.L.R.B. at 470.
17. See id. at 479 n. 1. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
recites the many NLRB charges which were eventually consolidated for hear-
ing and decision:
The relevant docket entries are as follows: Local 1038, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO filed charges against West Coast
in Case 7-CA-31302 on December 14, 1990, and a complaint issued
on January 31, 1991. The Union filed charges on April 3, 1991,
against Don Lee (Warren) in Case 7-CA-31719(2), against Don Lee
(Dearborn) in Case 7-CA-31719(3), against Powers in Case 7-CA-
31719(4), against Eastown in Case 7-CA-31719(5), against Hubert in
Case 7-CA-31719(6), and against Oak in Case 7-CA-31719(7).
Amended charges in Cases 7-CA-31719(2)-(7) were filed by the Un-
ion on April 26, 1991. The Union filed its charge in Case 7-CA-
32164(1) against Don Lee (Dearborn) and Don Lee (Warren) on
August 2, 1991. The Union filed its charge in Case 7-CA-32896
against Don Lee (Dearborn) on February 10, 1992, and amended it on
February 11 and March 16. The Union filed another charge in Case 7-
CA-32986 against Don Lee (Dearborn) on March 2, and amended it
on March 16 and 19. The charge in Case 7-CA-33649 against Powers
was filed by the Union on August 26, 1992, and the charge in Case 7-
CA-33707 against Don Lee (Warren) and Don Lee (Dearborn) was
200
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than 1000 pages of briefs were filed. 18 Based on this record, the
Board found the employers had violated the law and ordered them to
rescind changes they had made in working conditions and to make
employees whole for lost wages.19
Back pay began accumulating in 1991 and, with accumulated
interest over the time the case was pending, the total became an
enormous sum.20 Approximately 450 employees, some of whom lost
$17,000 a year, were entitled to back pay.21 There were additional
losses from cutbacks in pensions, vacations, holidays, and other sorts
of employee compensation.22 In 1994, after the AIJ issued his deci-
sion, Tinamarie Pappas, one of the Board attorneys who tried the
case, estimated the back pay liability for driver-salesmen's lost
commissions alone at $20 million.23 By June 1998, when the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision affirming the
violation, the union attorney estimated back pay to be at least $40
million.
24
These employer losses were not the only financial costs. Al-
though it did not suffer personally, trying and deciding a case lasting
sixty days was enormously expensive for the government. The back
pay was so great the employers risked being put out of business. The
workers lost homes, had marriages broken, and suffered mental dis-
tress as a result of the employers' use of implementation upon im-
passe.25 All these losses were suffered despite the fact that the em-
ployers' purpose was not to gain important business ends: they
wrecked lives and risked their own businesses to destroy workplace
codetermination and worker participation in the decisions that affect
filed on September 10, 1992. The first complaint issued on July 29,
1991, and subsequent complaints issued on September 30, April 28,
August 28, and October 30, 1992.
Id.
18. See Don Lee Distrib., Inc. (Warren), No. 7-CA-31719(2)-(7), 1994
NLRB LEXIS 971, at *105 n.20 (Dec. 1, 1994).
19. See Don Lee Distrib., 322 N.L.R.B. at 472-79.
20. See Beer Distributors Found to Bargain in Bad Faith With Detroit IBT
Local, 241 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-13 (Dec. 19, 1994).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Terry Kosdrosky, Beer Distributors Lose Back-pay Ruling Appeal,
CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., June 8, 1998, at 22, available at 1998 WL 8236116.
25. See Danmn, Legislative hItent, supra note 9, at 20.
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workers' lives-rights guaranteed in the NLRA-just so the employ-
ers could have unilateral control of their businesses. As bad as all
this is, the worst that could have happened from the union and work-
ers' point of view did not occur--the workers did not strike and were
not permanently replaced. The union was also able to hang on as the
workers' representative and fight to regain what was taken from
them. 7 Other workers have not been as lucky.
During the last two decades the doctrine of implementation upon
impasse has come to play a pernicious role: destroying collective
bargaining, encouraging employers to de-unionize, discouraging un-
organized workers from attempting to better their lot through collec-
tive bargaining, and ultimately driving down all workers' conditions
of employment.2 8 To understand how this can occur, it is necessary
to understand how implementation upon impasse works in practice.
Suppose you are a private sector employer and that your em-
ployees are represented by a union. The labor laws under which you
bargain state that when the parties get to an impasse, you, the em-
ployer, get to impose your final offer. What would you do if this
was, and it is, the law?2 9 Would you bargain with your employees'
collective bargaining representative with the goal of codetermining
the workplace? Possibly. Or would you offer the very terms you
would most like to have, were there no union, and which are also
likely to be terms the union and employees will find objectionable?
Indeed, the doctrine of implementation upon impasse offers al-
most no downside for the employer. Demanding deep concessions
and demanding unilateral control over working conditions not only
get you to an impasse, but once there, the employer is in a position to
impose the very terms it wants. If the union strikes, the employer
may permanently replace the strikers, and eventually the replace-
ments will vote the union out, or the union will walk away. All
26. See id.
27. Telephone Interviews with Samuel C. McKnight, Attorney (Dec. 1996-
Jan. 1997).
28. The doctrine that allows an employer to implement its final offer upon
reaching a bargaining impasse began to develop early in the history of the
NLRA; however, changes in the mid-1980s have fundamentally altered the
doctrine. For a history of these developments, see Dannin, Collective Bar-
gaining, supra note 9, at 41.
29. See id.
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through bargaining, an employer can use the threat of replacement to
force the union to agree to its terms, because the union does not dare
strike. The employer can threaten this or remind the union of the
law, but it does not even need to mention it; the union will know it is
in a very weak position.30
It does not even matter if the workers strike or not; if they stay
on the job, the employer can implement its final offer and enter an
uneasy situation with increasing employee dissatisfaction with the
union because it cannot improve their working conditions. In the
end, this may lead to de-unionization.
A recent study found that actual implementation occurred in
23% of negotiations.3' Kate Bronfenbrenner found that implementa-
tion occurred in 7% of negotiations, with unions striking as a result
of "blatantly unacceptable demands" in another 7%.32 She also
found that when an employer declares an impasse and implements its
final offer, unions won first contracts in only four of seven units.
33
Such a doctrine does nothing to promote collective bargaining,
an express purpose of the NLRA.? Indeed, almost nothing could be
better designed to undermine authentic negotiating. Yet, we contend,
this is the way the NLRA works and has been working, particularly
since the mid-1980s when the Board increasingly allowed employers
to come to the table with proposals that were predictably unaccept-
able to unions and workers and, once there, make no movement. 35
Since the mid-1980s, Board cases have forbidden the decision-maker
30. In a prior study of impasse and implementation, we found that the doc-
trine was involved in over half of all negotiations and had a pernicious influ-
ence on how bargaining takes place. See Ellen Dannin et al., Bargaining Im-
passes: Global Reflections (Jan. 5, 1997) (paper presented at the Industrial
Relations Research Association Meeting, New Orleans).
31. See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., Collective Bargaining in Small
Firms: Preliminary Evidence of Fundamental Change, 49 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REv. 195, 204 (1996).
32. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections
and First-Contract Campaigns, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 75, 86 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
33. See id. at 84, 86.
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1998).
35. See Dannin, Legislative hItent, supra note 9, at 33; Dannin, Collective
Bargaining, supra note 9, at 41 (examining the historical development of the
doctrine).
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from examining the content of employer proposals to determine
whether the employer is advancing them in good faith, rather than as
a ploy to create an impasse.36 In addition, the NLRA does not re-
quire employers to make any concessions or take any steps to reach
agreement.37
Indeed, during the mid-1980s the Board issued a number of de-
cisions which made it easier to reach a bona fide impasse and thus
for employers to implement their final offers. None of these deci-
sions has been overruled by the Board, so they continue to affect fu-
ture decisions as to whether a bona fide impasse exists and whether
implementation is legal. Through these decisions, the Board has
given employers freer rein to seek concessions without justifying the
need for them;38 to seek total discretion in setting wages;39 and to
have less obligation to provide information to the union upon the
employer's making a plea of poverty.40 The Board also became
more lenient in allowing an employer to re-implement an offer which
had been implemented prior to reaching impasse rather than having
to restore the status quo ante 4 ' and lowering the number of bargain-
ing sessions necessary to find an impasse existed. Employers were
even allowed to "schedule" impasse rather than having to reach a
36. See Dannin, Legislative Intent, supra note 9, at 38.
37. See id. at 11; Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 9, at 41 (ex-
amining the historical development of the doctrine). The 1980s were also a
time that saw a break with prior understandings and practices as to collective
bargaining. See Mitchell, supra note 1.
38. See Allbritton Communications, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 201, 206 (1984),
enforced, 766 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1985).
39. See Walter A. Zlogar, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1094 (1986); cf. Boz-
zuto's, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 977, 977 n.5 (1985); Taft Broad. Co., 274 N.L.R.B.
260, 268 (1985).
40. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1087 (1984)
(displaying that take-it-or-leave-it attitude not indicative of bad faith bargain-
ing).
41. See Dependable Bldg. Maint. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 27, 30 (1985); Fred E.
Fugazzi, Jr., 273 N.L.R.B. 501, 507 (1984).
42. See Walter A. Zlogar, 278 N.L.R.B. at 1090-91 (five sessions during
which the employer sought to cut wages by two-thirds, with discretion vested
in the employer to set wages); Hamady Bros. Food Mkts., 275 N.L.R.B. 1335,
1335 (1985) (five sessions); Lou Stecher's Super Mkts., 275 N.L.R.B. 475,
477 (1985) (three meetings of relatively brief duration in one week); Thomas
Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1190 (1984) (no meetings and no
negotiations prior to finding impasse).
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real deadlock, a point at which, despite the parties' best efforts,
movement is not possible. Finally, the Board reclassified subjects
as mandatory or permissive in a way that made impasse easier.44 In-
deed, the Board's view during this period was summed up by its
statement in E.L duPont de Neinours & Co. that the Board should
have "no undue reluctance to find that an impasse existed."'45
As a result, an employer today can do no real bargaining and
still not violate the law by bargaining in bad faith. The best unions
can do is make successive concessions in an effort to show that the
parties are not yet at impasse. They know that if the workers strike,
the employer cannot fire them but can permanently replace them. As
labor law professors are fond of asking rhetorically: "Query. Would
you rather be fired or permanently replaced?
'" 46
It is our contention that allowing employers to implement their
final offers makes a tremendous difference in how U.S. collective
bargaining works and also limits how effective U.S. unions can be.
It does this in many ways, including offering a legal tool to de-
unionize, rewarding employers who do not engage in real bargaining,
and ensuring that unions have less to offer workers and are thus less
attractive to workers.
H. THE STUDY
A. Methodology
All cases selected were decided by the Board in the period 1980
through 1994 which raised the issue of implementation upon impasse
in the context of negotiations for a complete collective bargaining
43. See H&H Pretzel Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1327, 1334 (1985).
44. See Reichhold Chems., Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1985).
45. E.I. duPont, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1076.
46. The difference is that strikers who have been permanently replaced re-
tain limited rights as employees. Strikers are included in the definition of em-
ployee. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). The right to strike cannot be infringed
upon. See id. § 163. Strikers have recall rights, see Laidlaw Corp., 171
N.L.R.B. 1366, 1367 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), and can participate in Board elections for twelve
months after the strike commences. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). But for the
most part, and especially after that time, this seems to be a difference without
any real distinction.
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agreement and all cases involving permanent replacement of strik-
ers.4 7 Impasse and implementation cases were excluded in situations
other than negotiations for a complete contract such as partial re-
openers, mid-term bargaining, or mid-term unilateral modifications
of contract terms. Excluding these situations provided a set of cases
focused more directly on implementation upon impasse unmuddied
by other applicable doctrines. 48 Only about 2% of charges filed, or
roughly 500 cases, each year go through to Board decision. 49 The
study found 228 cases that fit the requisite parameters. Even though
these cases are a small subset of all implementation upon impasse
cases decided by the Board and of all bargaining affected by this
47. To do this, we used the Bureau of National Affairs' (BNA) Labor Re-
lations Reporting Manual Classification Index to locate all cases which were
classified as involving the issues of employer unilateral implementation of
changed terms and of permanent replacement of strikers.
48. We are conscious that there are special problems that apply to a study
based on NLRB decisions, and these affect both gathering and interpreting
data. Board decisions are not written for the needs of researchers and do not
include all the data we were looking for that would allow us to present it in a
uniform way. More important, cases that reach the Board are a select group
that may not fully represent the overall state of negotiations. Before a case
reaches the Board, a charge must first be filed with one of the Board's regional
offices. Unions facing bad faith bargaining-potential violations of
§ 8(a)(5)-must decide whether to file a charge. Those decisions reflect accu-
rate or inaccurate readings of the law, political decisions by the local or inter-
national, and a weighing of the practical impact of winning or losing the case.
One of the authors was a field attorney in a Board region during much
of the period under study and has first-hand experience with regional Board
practices. If a charge is filed, the NLRB region decides whether to issue a
complaint after an investigation lasting about thirty days. Complaints are is-
sued in about thirty to forty percent of charges filed. Many cases settle at this
point, as well as just before the hearing before an ALJ and just after the ALJ
decision is issued. Impasse cases which settle are likely to involve clear viola-
tions. This means that cases decided by the Board on appeal from the ALJ de-
cision will include more controverted disputes than those which are resolved at
earlier stages. It is also far more likely that appeals will be filed by employers
who have lost before the ALJ. This is the result of Board policy not to appeal
ALJ decisions, particularly those based on credibility findings, because it is
difficult to get them reversed. An employer who loses, on the other hand, may
see it as beneficial to delay the ultimate decision and may, therefore, appeal a
loss based on credibility findings. Thus, cases decided by the Board will be a
small and skewed set of the charges filed.
49. See NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 (1985).
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doctrine, it seems likely that many of the issues examined in this
study will also apply to that larger set of cases. The cases in this
study comprise about 22% of the Board cases dealing with the issue
of implementation upon impasse. It is important, then, to bear in
mind that implementation occurs in many other contexts and has a
far wider impact than is captured in this study.
B. The Results
1. The Board decisions
A major factor potentially affecting outcomes before the Board
is the make-up of the five-member Board itself. During the period
studied, there were twenty-one Board members, of whom twelve
were Republicans, eight Democrats, and one Independent. Table I
shows each member's voting record on implementation. If a mem-
ber sat on a case which found implementation to be illegal, but that
member dissented, the vote was counted as upholding implementa-
tion. Table 1 demonstrates a loose link between party affiliation and
votes on implementation. Seven Democrats and four Republicans
found more cases to involve an illegal implementation than the mean
indicates. By contrast, those more likely to find implementation le-
gal included one Democrat, seven Republicans, and one Independ-
ent.
Republicans were also far more likely to dissent. Of the twelve
dissenters, eight were Republicans, three Democrats, and one Inde-
pendent. Of the nine members who never dissented, there were four
Republicans and five Democrats. Chairman Donald Dotson (1983-
1987) dissented most often-of the twenty-nine dissenting opinions,
six (24%) were by Dotson.
The data demonstrate that not all Republicans are the same and
that not all Democrats are the same. Even more important than party
affiliation appears to be the era during which a member served.
Thus, in the earliest and latest years in the study, all members were
less likely to uphold implementation; whereas, in the middle years-
the Van de Water-Dotson years--the Board was more likely to up-
hold implementation.
The Dotson years were particularly notable for the high degree
of discord within the Board as characterized by the number of dis-
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sents. Both before and after, dissents were relatively rare. Thus, it is
fair to say that by the middle years of this period, the Board had be-
come highly politicized, less collegial, and less able to reach consen-
sus than in earlier years. 50
TABLE 1: CASES DECIDED BY BOARD MEMBERS5
Name Months Number Implemen-
Chair Party Term in of tation Dissents
Period Cases Legal
2
Mean 25.4%
Jenkins R 8/28/63 - 8/27/83
Fanning* D 12/20/57 -12/16/82
Penello D 2/22/72 - 1/14/81
Truesdale D 10/25/77 - 8/27/80
10/23/80 - 1/26/81
1/24/94 - 3/3/94
Zimmerman I 9/17/80 - 12/16/84
Hunter
Van de
Water*
R 8/14/81 - 8/27/85
R 8/18/81 - 12/16/82
44 29 24.1%
24 28 25%
13 13 7.7%
13 8
51 29 37.9%
48 29 55.2%
16 4 50%
50. See Jules Bernstein & Laurance E. Gold, Mid-life Crisis: The N.L.R.B.
atFifty, 106 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (June 3, 1985).
51. Information derived from National Labor Relations Board Members,
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/members.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2000),
and our data.
52. Boldface indicates more likely than the mean to find the implementa-
tion illegal.
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Name Months Number 
Implemen-
Chir Party Term In of tatlon Dissents
Period Cases Legal
Miller* R
Dotson* R
Dennis D
Johansen R
Babson D
Stephens R
Cracraft D
Devaney D
Higgins R
Oviatt R
Raudabaugh R
Gould* D
Browning D
Cohen R
12/23/82 - 37183 3 0
3/7/83 - 12/16/87 58 53
515/83 - 6/24/86 37 29
5/28/85 -6/15/89 48 57
7/1/85 -7/31/88 36 55
10/16/85 - 8/27/95 118 122
117/86 - 8/27/91 57 61
11/22/88 - 12/1694 60 60
8/29/88 -11/22/89 15 11
12/14/89- 5/28/93 41 39
8/27/90 -11/26/93 39 33
3/7/94 - 8/27/98 10 6
3/9/94 -2/28/97 10 6
3/18/94 - 8/27/96 9 3
45.3%
34.5%
17.5%
7.3%
25A%
23.0%
21.7%
45.5%
28.2%
33.3%
0%
0%
0%
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In short, these figures demonstrate not only a great deal of dissension
in the Dotson years with an eventual return to a more collegial at-
mosphere by the early 1990s, but also a greater likelihood that the
NLRB would find an implementation to be legal during that same
period than either before or after.
2. Effect of implementation upon impasse on negotiations
The biggest surprise in the data was the extent of implementa-
tion upon impasse in mature bargaining relationships. Cases in the
study varied from relationships of under one year to over seventy-
five years. See Figure 1. The figures greatly understate the extent to
which this is the case because 23% of cases did not specify the
length of the bargaining relationship. Ten percent of the cases stated
they involved long-term collective bargaining relationships. It also
seems likely that the data account for all cases which involve first
contracts or very young bargaining relationships, because these facts
would likely be relevant to the discussion of bargaining. In older
cases, events connected with the formation of the relationship are
less relevant to bargaining and, in very long relationships, may even
have been forgotten. In any case, even excluding cases for which
there are no exact figures, it is clear that a very large number involve
long-established relationships: over 23% of cases had relationships
of over twenty-five years, 6% of which were older than forty years.
Implementation upon impasse certainty also occurs within long-
established collective bargaining relationships in the real world and
that this is not solely an artifact of our sample. Many previously
unionized firms were in the process of de-unionizing in this period,
including by opening new nonunion plants to replace older plants or
by de facto conversions to nonunion status through replacement of
union workers during labor disputes.53 Both processes could involve
bargaining to impasse, implementation of a final offer, a strike, or
lockout and replacement of the workers.
To the extent that implementation upon impasse is used as a tool
to de-unionize, the presence of so many troubled long-term relation-
ships should be of deep concern to unions. Union membership can
53. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 441.
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decline as a result of de-unionization just as much as from failing to
organize new members. Even worse, implementation upon impasse
and de-unionization may actually make organizing new members
more difficult. Each time a union loses a site, it could be used to
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of unions and the futility of collec-
tive bargaining.
FIGURE 1: LENGTH OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
Length of the Collective Bargaining Relationship
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Indeed, the problem of impasse for longer-term relationships is
even more serious than the fact that many very mature relationships
are included in the data. Unions with long-term relationships fared
less well when employers declared impasse and implemented their
final offers than those in first contract cases. The Board found im-
plementation legal in 21.4% of first-contract cases versus 26.3% for
all other contracts. Furthermore, the longer the relationship, the less
likely the Board was to find implementation to be illegal. The suc-
cess rate declines from 21% for first contracts to 30% for bargaining
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relationships over thirty years. This is summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2: IMPLEMENTATION FoUND PROPER BY LENGTH OF
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
Number of Cases Implementation
Legal
First Contract 42 21.43%
1-10 years 46 23.91%
11-20 years 26 23.08%
21-30 years 41 24.39%
+30 years 43 30.23%
Total 198
Many factors might explain this trend. In first contract cases,
the record often included evidence of a hard-fought anti-union cam-
paign complete with many anti-union statements and § 8(a)(1) 54 and
(3) violations." Such a record would more easily permit the deci-
sion-maker to infer that anti-union motives existed and, thus, that the
bargaining was not taking place in good faith where evidence was
otherwise ambiguous.
The passage of many years alters this picture drastically. Not
only would evidence of the organizing campaign be irrelevant, but
the campaign might have taken place so long ago that no one recalls
it. Compared with an organizing campaign, bargaining does not nec-
essarily lend itself to opportunities to make the sort of statements that
would reveal an anti-union motive. Indeed, it would be reasonable to
assume that parties to a long-term relationship have worked out an
amicable way of dealing with one another. In addition, particularly
through the 1980s, the record often included evidence of declining
industries suffering severe financial distress. All this would make it
easier to conclude whether an employer's demands, even for deep
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
55. See id. § 158(a)(3).
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concessions, were legitimate, that impasse was bona fide, and that
implementation was legal
These assumptions, reasonable as they may appear, may never-
theless be inaccurate. An employer with a long-term relationship
could have had long harbored anti-union motives but felt it was un-
able to extricate itself from its bargaining obligation. Alternatively,
an employer could have changed its attitude toward union represen-
tation as a result of economic need, management consultants' advis-
ing it of the benefits of de-unionizing, or an anti-union climate. It
may be that, although the corporate employer remains the same, in
reality, it had changed ownership-which was common throughout
this period-and the new owners had different attitudes and policies
towards unionization. This sort of evidence was included in a few
cases but may have existed in others where it was not presented. If
so, it would be wrong to assume that a long-term relationship negates
the possibility of anti-union motives for reaching an impasse.
Knowing that implementation upon impasse is more likely to be
found legal in longer-term relationships, in and of itself, is of no
clear significance. On the one hand, disagreements occur during all
phases of human relationships. Thus, the problems that led to filing
a charge and eventually a Board decision may be temporary and,
once the parties have sorted things out, may have little long-term im-
port. However, if implementation upon impasse is being used as a
tool to de-unionize, there should be real concern on many levels. For
unions, it means that bargaining is not a process of negotiating the
reordering of the relationship to meet new needs. Rather, it is enter-
ing a treacherous minefield from which they may not return alive.
For those who believe in the rule of law, it would mean that the vi-
sion set out in the NLRA-to promote collective bargaining as a
means of promoting democratic values and defusing conflict--is
being subverted by the very process that is supposed to strengthen
collective bargaining.56 It is almost as if the law had become a vic-
tim of demonic possession, wreaking havoc amongst its loved ones.
What we have found-and the data supporting this are discussed
below--demonstrates that, in many cases, implementation upon im-
passe is indeed being used by employers who do not want to bargain
56. See Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 9, at 41.
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but, rather, want to rid themselves of unions including shedding very
long-term collective bargaining relationships. This was not always
the case. It was only made possible by changes that took place in the
interpretation of the doctrine of implementation upon impasse in the
mid-1980s. Each of these changes resulted in making it easier to
reach a bona fide impasse and to implement a final offer.
One key change involved how much time, if any, the Board
would require the parties to spend bargaining as evidence that a good
faith effort had been made to resolve the parties' differences. If there
is no such requirement, in the most extreme case, an employer could,
at the first session, say it was firm in its views and would not be
swayed, so the parties were at an impasse. Before the rnid-1980s, the
Board required the parties to meet and negotiate for sufficient time,
defined by the number of sessions, before it would find an impasse.5
During the 1980s it would find a bona fide impasse even though the
parties had engaged in minimal bargaining.
We found a mixed pattern, as we would expect if some employ-
ers were engaging in actual bargaining and some were trying to get
to impasse as quickly as possible. In a large number of cases, the
total number of bargaining sessions could not be determined, so it is
useful to consider the data both including and excluding the missing
cases. Thirty percent of the overall cases involved more than ten ne-
gotiating sessions, but 21% involved five or fewer. Most striking,
4% involved no sessions at all. See Table 3. The comparable figures
when the missing cases are excluded show impasse declared in 39%
of cases with more than ten sessions, 25% with five or fewer, and 5%
with no meetings. These figures alone are not sufficient to conclude
that employers were seeking to achieve impasse. Clearly, many-
though not a majority-met enough times that even if they wanted to
reach impasse they were not trying to reach it as quickly as possible.
However, roughly a quarter involve so few sessions they at least do
not dispel the possibility that impasse was a goal. Certainly the
fewer sessions, and especially those cases in which no bargaining
57. See id. at 55-56.
58. See id.; cf Matthew M. Bodah & Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Employer
Escape from Collective Bargaining: A Longitudinal Analysis 5-6 (Nov. 12,
1996) (Industrial Relations Research Association Contributed Papers in Col-
lective Bargaining).
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took place, suggest that reaching impasse and thus being able to de-
unionize was a goal. In sum, the number of bargaining sessions does
not rule out that reaching impasse and, ultimately, de-unionizing was
the goal.
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF BARGAINING SESSIONS BEFORE IMPASSE WAS
DECLARED
NUMBER OF SESSIONS TOTAL
None 9
1-5 38
6-10 69
11-15 36
16-20 13
21-30 13
>30 11
Unknown 39
In addition to the number of meetings, the time within which
these occurred is useful in assessing efforts to bargain in good faith.
Figure 2 shows the length of bargaining in terms of months at the
time the charge was filed.
FIGuRE 2: LENGTH OF BARGAINING
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Forty percent of cases involved bargaining extending less than
six months, 36% involved bargaining of under three months, and
14% involved bargaining of less than one month. On the other end,
17% of cases involved bargaining of one year or longer. Thus, there
is no strong pattern overall. Putting together the number of times
parties met and the length of time during which many negotiations
took place, it is fair to say that somewhat less than half of employers
made serious efforts to meet. However, a slight majority of negotia-
tions show employers claimed impasse had been reached relatively
soon after the start of bargaining. The earlier an employer claims
impasse has been reached, the more this suggests a strategy of union
avoidance rather than a bona fide breakdown in negotiations.5 9
However, without more, no real conclusions can be reached.
Our data should naturally show a connection between impasse
and permanent replacement of strikers. Strikes generally occur in re-
sponse to a bargaining impasse, and once a strike occurs, strikers
may be replaced. Permanently replacing economic strikers 60 is one
effective way to de-unionize. 61 Once strikers are replaced, either the
union and workers will be so dispirited that they give up or find other
jobs and drift away, or a decertification vote can be held in which the
replacements are likely to be the majority of voters. Furthermore,
59. A recent survey found that most settlements were reached within one
month of the contract expiration date but did not break down total length of
negotiations. See Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 1, at 27.
60. Employers may permanently replace economic strikers. See I THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 237-45 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. They may hire only temporary
replacements for unfair labor practice strikers. See II THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 1100-02 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter II THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw].
61. The industrial relations community has expressed strong concern over
employers' ability to replace strikers. See Cynthia L. Gramm, Empirical Evi-
dence on Political Arguments Relating to Replacement Worker Legislation, 42
LAB. L.J. 491, 492-93 (1991); Michael H. LeRoy, The McKay Radio Doctrine
of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act:
Questions of Preemption, 77 MINN. L. REV. 843 (1993); John F. Schnell &
Cynthia L. Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between Employers' Strike Re-
placement Strategies and Strike Duration, 47 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 189
(1994). This concern has been taken sufficiently seriously as to have generated
proposals for federal legislation regulating employers' ability to replace strik-
ers. See Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993).
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the threat of permanent replacement should make unions less effec-
tive in bargaining. All parties realize that striking workers can be re-
placed. If everyone knows the union cannot afford to strike, the un-
ion has lost a significant resource to pressure the employer to settle
and certainly to reach a good settlement. As a result, the union will
likely have dissatisfied members. Unions became acutely aware of
the problems of using a strike within the period of this study and thus
moved to using alternate pressure strategies, such as "the inside
game.
' 62
Given all this, one would expect to find relatively few strikes;
however, strikes occurred in 144 of 228 cases, or in 63.6% of cases.
It is impossible to know whether this percentage would have been
higher in the absence of union concerns about striker replacement
and the consequently lower value of the strike as an economic
weapon. In any case, unions were either unaware of the conse-
quences of striking or found themselves unable to conceive of any
other strategy once they reached impasse. Permanent replacements
were hired in sixty-seven cases, or in 46.5% of the strikes. 63
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld found that unions perceived a threat to
use replacements in about 15% of negotiations and that replacements
were actually used in 28.6% of first contract negotiations and 4.2%
of renewal contracts.64 It is impossible to say why employers did not
hire replacements in more cases. It may be that they could not find
replacements with appropriate skills, or other factors may have pre-
vented them. Unions might have failed to file charges in every case
62. Cf YATES, supra note 1, at 57-71; see also Mitchell, supra note 1, at
441-46 (noting the rise of concession bargaining); Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al.,
supra note 1, at 27 (noting that strike threat has diminished); Craig Becker,
"Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1994) (pro-
moting an alternative form of collective work stoppage called repeated griev-
ance strike); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018
(1998) (describing various tactics and goals of shareholder activism).
63. This figure may understate the existence of permanent replacement.
The union might not have alleged this as a violation in an impasse case charge
even though it might have occurred, and if it was not alleged as a violation it
might well not have been litigated and certainly the decision would then be
unlikely to discuss it.
64. See Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 1, at 28.
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involving permanent replacements, meaning the figures would un-
derstate the actual incidence. This, however, seems unlikely. Re-
placement is such a dire event for a union that even if the union felt
its chances of prevailing on the charge were low it would nonetheless
try.
Given the nature of the law, a key union strategy to preserve the
right to strike must be to prevent permanent replacement of strikers.
It is possible to do this depending on how a strike is characterized.
Strikes are classified based on whether they are motivated by em-
ployer unfair labor practices or by economic issues. 65 This classifi-
cation has enormous implications. Employers may hire temporary
replacements for either economic or unfair labor practice strikers but
may not permanently replace unfair labor practice strikers.6 Unions
thus have an incentive to position themselves so a strike will be clas-
sified as an unfair labor practice strike. The determination as to how
a strike is classified is highly fact sensitive and depends on evidence
which demonstrates why the workers struck. This evidence can be
found in the subjects discussed during the meeting at which a strike
vote was taken, the wording of a strike resolution, and the language
on picket signs. However, unless the employer is found to have
committed unfair labor practices and unless those unfair labor prac-
tices are found to have actually motivated the strike, the strike will
ultimately be found to be an economic strike.67 This means that un-
ions have an incentive to file bad faith bargaining charges when a
strike has occurred or is about to occur.
A strike's initial classification can change. Thus, a strike ini-
tially classified as economic, and which leaves workers vulnerable to
replacement, can convert to an unfair labor practice strike if the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices prolong it.68 This new status will then
affect whether strikers may be permanently replaced from that point
on. 69 Given union incentives to ensure that a strike be classified as
an unfair labor practice strike, it is worth noting that most strikes in
65. See I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 60, at 1099-110.
66. See id. at 1100-10; I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAWV, supra note 60, at
237-45.
67. See II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 60, at 1100.
68. See id. at 1102-03.
69. See id.
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the study were economic-both initially and at their end. Nearly
two-thirds of strikes were initially economic strikes. As shown in
Table 4, only about 10% converted from economic to unfair labor
practice strikes. This means that most employers faced with strikes
had the power to permanently replace the strikers, a step that can
easily lead to de-unionization.
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF ECONOMIC V. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
STRIMS
INITIAL PURPOSE FINAL PURPOSE
Economic 63.6% 52.7%
ULP 36.4% 47.2%
In summing up the data so far, many of the preconditions for de-
unionization actually existed. Many employers were claiming to
reach impasse after relatively few bargaining sessions; many nego-
tiations resulted in strikes; and most strikes were found to be eco-
nomic strikes. Although impasse can lead to permanent replacement
of strikers, and through it to de-unionization, it remains to be proven
that these outcomes were actually desired by employers and that they
took steps designed to reach these outcomes. The data discussed in
the next section provide support that this is precisely what was taking
place in many of these negotiations.
3. Are employers using implementation upon impasse
to de-unionize?
The mere fact that an impasse occurs in bargaining is not itself a
cause for concern. Human beings often disagree, particularly when
their interests clash, and employers and unions often have adverse
interests. The concern is that impasse has become not so much a de-
scription of a normal stage in negotiations as a goal employers desire
to reach-and one that the law assists employers in reaching. It has
become a desirable goal because it triggers an employer's right to
take unilateral control of a workplace whether or not it also leads to
de-unionization.
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Determining whether employers were-and are-using imple-
mentation upon impasse as a tool to de-unionize is not easy. If an
employer admitted doing such a thing, it would be confessing to
violating the law. Thus, employers, especially those with attorneys
and those facing Board charges, are unlikely to admit they tried to
cause an impasse because they wanted to get rid of a union. None-
theless, an employer who uses bargaining to de-unionize should be-
have differently than one who wants to reach an agreement, and
those differences should give us insights into the scope of the prob-
lem.
70
In this sample, all cases (except the few selected only because
they involved permanent replacement of strikers) should be ones in
which the employer declared that an impasse was reached. It seems
significant then that the Board did not agree with this conclusion in
the majority of cases. Instead, the Board found that a state of im-
passe was reached in only 39.92% of our cases. Reaching impasse
should mean that the parties are deadlocked and can make no further
movement. In other words, the Board found that 60% of the em-
ployers had declared an impasse when there was not, in fact, a true
deadlock or impasse.
Even if an impasse is reached, it may not be a legal impasse. An
employer can only implement its final offer if a legal or bona fide
impasse is reached. When an impasse is bona fide and thus legal, it
has occurred despite the parties' good faith efforts to reach an
agreement. An impasse can be held to be illegal or not bona fide for
a variety of reasons including an employer's insistence to impasse on
a nonmandatory subject 71 or its commission of other unfair labor
70. Our data suggests that at least some employers are motivated by anti-
union sentiment in reaching impasse. Given the nature of our sample, it is un-
clear to what extent this conclusion may apply to bargaining generally. We
recognize that not all instances in which impasses occur, even those which may
potentially present violations, will result in the filing of a charge. The over-
whelming majority of cases settle or are dismissed after charges are filed.
Cases in which outcomes are fairly predictable are most likely to settle early.
Thus, cases decided by the Board should represent the most protracted degree
of conflict. On the other hand, to say that they are not fully representative does
not mean that they tell us nothing about negotiations.
71. See I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 60, at 604-07.
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practices.7 2 The Board found that 69.9% of impasses were not legal.
Unfortunately, Board and ALJ decisions often are not as clear as they
could be as to whether they have found that no impasse occurred or
that an impasse occurred that was the result of bad faith bargaining
and thus not a bona fide impasse. Given the vagueness of many de-
cisions on this point, it is more meaningful to note that in 74% of
cases in the study, the Board found that no impasse or bona fide im-
passe had been reached. This means that any implementation would
therefore be illegal.
In other words, the overwhelming majority of cases in which
employers were claiming to be at impasse were found by the Board
either (1) not to be true impasses or (2) not to be legal impasses.
This finding in and of itself calls into question the role implementa-
tion upon impasse plays. If these findings are eventually supported
by other studies, then employers are wrong three-fourths of the time
when they declare impasses. Given the serious consequences which
can flow from the declaration of an impasse and the length of time it
can take to reach a decision-a decision which in most cases will
find that no legal impasse was reached--something very wrong is
happening here. Either employers are very confused as to the law
and its application to collective bargaining, or they are purposely
acting in ways the law defines as violations of good faith collective
bargaining. It should not be the case that such a large percentage of
employers--most of whom are guided by legal counsel or manage-
ment consultants-is getting the law wrong so often. If they are,
whatever the cause, this, in and of itself, suggests that the doctrine of
implementation upon impasse should be rethought.
Unfortunately, merely being wrong on the law is not the most
serious problem. More troubling is evidence that these wrong calls
are part of a strategy to subvert the collective bargaining rights of
millions of workers. Finding that most of these cases did not involve
legal or bona fide impasses does not necessarily mean they were a
mere tactic to de-unionize. More is needed before we can draw that
conclusion.
One way to determine whether an impasse is a tactic is to ex-
amine the nature of the issues which led to impasse. Until the mid-
72. See id.
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1980s, the Board examined the content of employer proposals to de-
termine whether they were advanced to undermine negotiations. If
the Board concluded an employer had offered proposals no self-
respecting union would accept, it found there was bad faith bargain-
ing.73 Proposals that were characterized in this way included matters
that intruded into intra-union affairs or which effectively precluded
unions from having a role in codetermining employee wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment-that is, proposals
that removed the union's ability to act as an effective representa-
tive.74
During the mid-1980s, the Board reversed this line of cases. It
refused to permit any conclusions about an employer's good faith
based on an examination of its proposals beyond determining
whether they were to be classified as mandatory or permissive sub-
jects of bargaining.75 The consequences of this change in doctrine of
making impasse more easily reached should be obvious. One way to
achieve impasse in any negotiations is to come to the table with pro-
posals you know the other side will not accept. With no check on
what could be offered, this change in the law practically invited an
employer that wished to de-unionize to advance proposals it knew
would be unacceptable to the union, insist upon them to impasse, and
then, if it wished, implement its final offer containing the unaccept-
able proposals.76
One would expect most real impasses in bargaining to involve
economic issues. Economic issues generally involve wages in some
form and, after all, these are the issues that are most likely to be im-
portant to both employers and workers. 77 However, the data summa-
73. See Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 9, at 44-46.
74. See id. at 42-43.
75. For a description of these developments, see Dannin, Collective Bar-
gaining, supra note 9, at 51-53.
76. Cf Indus. Elec. Reels, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1072 (1993) (holding
that the duty to bargain does not preclude a party from making its best offer
first and refusing to move). Recently, the Board has begun to retreat from this
position. In ConAgra, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 944, 945 (1996), it stated that it
would consider the employer's having made a severe and predictably unac-
ceptable concessionary offer as one among other factors demonstrating the
employer's bad faith.
77. In using the term "economic" issues here, we are using it in its com-
mon, rather than legal, sense-that is, we are using it to mean proposals on is-
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rized in Table 5 show that economic issues were the known key
cause of impasse in only 37% of cases. In other words, close to two-
thirds of impasses in this sample were caused by the employer's ad-
vancing proposals other than those concerning economics.
TABLE5: IssuES LEADING TO IMPASSE
ISSUE NUMBER PERCENTf
Economic Issues 84 36.8
Control Issues 124 50.0
Unknown 30 13.2
If economic issues were not leading to impasse, what sorts of is-
sues so concerned employers that they declared the parties to be
deadlocked? The proposals grouped together in Table 5 as "control
issues" include proposals designed to give employers unilateral con-
trol over the workplace or which concern internal union matters.78
The control issues include eliminating or altering seniority, changes
in job classifications, rights to contract union work out, management
rights, and merit pay or internal union matters, such as dues checkoff
and union security. Not only would these proposals give manage-
ment more control by permitting employers to act as if no union rep-
resented the workers, these proposals are ones to which no union is
likely to agree.79 The majority of what we have classified here as
control issues break down into 54% multiple control issues leading to
sues directly affecting money. We are not using it as synonymous with man-
datory issues.
78. In using "control issues," we are not using it as synonymous with none-
conomic or permissive issues, as commonly defined in labor law. In fact,
some of these control issues could be considered mandatory or economic is-
sues. To the extent the employer can force an impasse on a control issue
which is also a mandatory subject of bargaining, it can more easily reach a
bona fide impasse.
79. A recent study found, for example, that issues of union security were
raised in nearly half of negotiations and were likely not to lead to agreement on
that issue. In addition, issues such as pay for knowledge-which might in-
clude merit pay proposals--and alterations in job classification involving
teams and work rule flexibility were very frequently raised and also tended to
result in a failure to reach agreement on those items. See Cutcher-Gershenfeld
et al., supra note 1, at 26-27.
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impasse; 20% union security clauses or dues checkoff; 8% changes
in job classification; and 18% scope of the unit.
The fact that employers are claiming to have reached impasse on
control issues rather than economic issues suggests that reaching im-
passe is the goal. Certainly, these are the sorts of issues which an
employer who abides by the law and recognizes a union as the le-
gitimate representative of its workers will be willing to compromise
or to take a hands-off attitude toward. Only an employer unwilling
to codetermine the workplace with its workers or one bent on de-
unionization will insist to impasse on these sorts of issues. That we
would find such a high percentage of them should not be surprising
given that the Board found so many of the declared impasses in our
sample to be illegal.
Indeed, if anything, looking at reaching impasse on control is-
sues as a proxy for intent to force an impasse actually understates
that intent. Employers can also advance economic offers it knows
will be unacceptable to the union. For example, an employer's de-
mands for deep concessions-and especially if it is profitable-will
present the union with an offer the union will feel it cannot accept
and which it is likely to feel is not being made in good faith. A strike
based on an impasse on an economic issue will be an economic
strike, and the strikers may be permanently replaced. As a result, if
an employer is bent on de-unionizing, it is to an employer's advan-
tage to advance predictably unacceptable economic issues. It is im-
possible in this data set to determine whether this is the case in any
instance; therefore, the best that can be said is that the evidence on
the causes of impasse likely understates an intent to de-unionize.
Given the impossibility of asking for and receiving a direct an-
swer from an employer as to whether it intended to de-unionize, the
next most direct way to determine employer intent is to search for
anti-union statements and other evidence of a desire to de-unionize.
Employers made anti-union statements in approximately 30% of
cases. This figure is likely to understate the existence of anti-union
feeling, because we tried to be conservative in classifying cases on
this point. Thus, although no statements were found in most cases,
this does not mean none were made in reality or that the existence of
reported statements captures the scope of a desire to de-unionize.
This category also is likely to be understated, given the nature of
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Board cases. Unless such a statement was alleged as a violation of
section 8(a)(1), evidence of it might not have been introduced. Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) violations based on anti-union statements are unlikely;
section 8(c) allows employers to make anti-union statements as long
as they do not involve a threat or a promise of benefit. Therefore,
anti-union statements can be made without constituting an unfair la-
bor practice. On the other hand, Board attorneys will attempt to in-
troduce evidence of anti-union animus-and it would be relevant-if
a case involved violations of section 8(a)(3). However, an employer
which has received good legal advice and is attempting to reach an
impasse and to de-unionize would likely be warned not to make anti-
union statements and, even if it does, be warned to hedge statements
so that a union is less likely to file a charge or a region to issue a
complaint. Given all these factors, it seems most likely that the fig-
ure strongly understates the existence of anti-union feeling. Thus, at
least one-third of these employers made anti-union statements.
If de-unionization is a goal, it seemed possible that the cases
might reveal employers' desires to de-unionize. This desire is an-
other factor likely to be understated in the data. An employer may
say it does not want a union; however, many may feel this way but
do not make such a statement for fear it might make the Board less
likely to find a bona fide impasse. The conclusion here is admittedly
a somewhat subjective one, based on the totality of employer con-
duct and statements. Given the subjectivity involved in such an as-
sessment, the study took a conservative approach and found a desire
to de-unionize only when it was clearly present. Such a desire was
found when an employer stated a desire to de-unionize or when there
was clear evidence of such a desire based on a course of conduct
which could include anti-union statements and retaliation against
employees for union activity, as well as a course of serious bad faith
bargaining. This means that these figures likely underrepresent the
number of cases in which a desire to de-unionize exists.
As shown in Table 6, employers demonstrated no desire to de-
unionize in 18% of cases and wanted to de-unionize in over 39% of
cases. The problem is that the conservative approach means cases
categorized as "unknown" are the largest percentage. In fact, most
cases-430/o--were categorized as "unknown." It is not possible
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definitively to interpret them, but it is possible with additional con-
sideration to draw some meaningful conclusions as to employers' de-
sires.
The study cannot assume that all 43% wished either to de-
unionize or not to de-unionize. Thus, it cannot add this 43% to the
known 39% to conclude that 82% of employers wished to de-
unionize; nor can we add the 43% to the known 18% to conclude that
61% did not want to de-unionize. If the study treated the unknown
cases as representing the same proportion of sentiments as in the
known cases, it would find an employer desire to de-unionize in 68%
of cases. This figure may be too high or still too low, because it is
impossible to know whether the unknown cases reflect the same pro-
portion of sentiments as in the known cases. It may be that none of
the employers in the unknown cases wished to de-unionize or all
may have wanted to de-unionize. It is fair to conclude that an accu-
rate figure lies somewhere between the two measures.
The least controversial conclusion is that 39% of employers
demonstrated a clear desire to de-unionize, and this probably under-
states the true level of desire. However, even if 390/---the lowest
credible figure-is the total of all employers who wish to de-
unionize, and have acted on that desire in seeking an impasse, this is
actually a high proportion of employers. If a level of 39% is trou-
bling, the true level should be a cause for deep concern. All signs
point to the likelihood it is much higher.
TABLE 6: DiD THE EMPLOYER WANT TO DE-UNIONIZE?
NUMBER PERCENT
Yes 88 38.6
No 41 18.0
Unknown 99 43.4
A recent survey of collective bargaining found that nearly 30%
of unions rank low trust as a factor heavily influencing negotiations,
and 15% were concerned for the future of the union. 0 The data
80. See id. at 25.
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suggest that a basis for those concerns exists in some employers' use
of collective bargaining as a tool to de-unionize.
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1 of the NLRA states that it is the policy of the United
States to "encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining" and to "protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." s1
If this is the law-and it still is-it is difficult to see how the Board
could have adopted and continue to use a doctrine that subverts col-
lective bargaining, prevents workers from exercising any rights of
self-organization, and prevents them from codetermining the terms
and conditions of their employment. Implementation upon impasse
disempowers workers and leaves them without access to a friendly
means of adjusting labor disputes. It thus undermines a basic insti-
tution and democratic values.
Unions have been under severe stress for decades now, some of
which has been caused by economic forces. Much of the period ex-
amined here was one in which unions faced enormous struggles. It
saw the breakdown of established bargaining patterns in core indus-
tries, such as automobiles and steel, the introduction of two-tiered
wage systems, and the use of bankruptcy proceedings to break con-
tracts.82 Concession bargaining-defined as freezes or cuts in the
basic wage-was made necessary by U.S. economic problems start-
ing in the late 1970s. Concession bargaining peaked in the period
1982 to 1985 and has declined since then as economic conditions
have improved.
However, the end of economic trouble did not mean the end of
pressures on unions. Defined more broadly, concession bargaining
has lingered into the 1990s. 83 Indeed, by the end of the 1980s bar-
gaining units were disappearing in relatively less depressed
81. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
82. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 435.
83. See id. at 439.
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industries, suggesting that after 1983, employers were increasingly
choosing to escape collective bargaining relationships.
84
Less discussed and even more unfortunate, law has contributed
to unbalancing employer and employee power. As economic condi-
tions improved, the Board began introducing changes in impasse law
which further tipped the balance of power in the employer's favor.
The data support a conclusion that implementation upon impasse has
been used to ends other than securing economic concessions and
more towards achieving employer hegemony. The outcomes in these
cases suggest that the current state of collective bargaining may be
worse than economic studies limited to examining concessionary
bargaining suggest. In cases involving implementation upon impasse
many negotiations would achieve no collective bargaining agree-
ment. Therefore, these cases would not appear in studies of conces-
sionary bargaining because they were limited to examining the terms
in collective bargaining agreements and did not examine the details
of party behavior or outcomes beyond the four comers of a docu-
ment.
The data suggest that current Board doctrines have strayed so far
from the NLRA's purposes and policies that serious consideration
needs to be given to reversing them and replacing them with methods
of resolving impasses that promote serious negotiations. Realizing
this means urging the Board to reconsider the entire doctrine as well
as its discrete parts, including at least refusing to scrutinize proposals
to determine whether they were advanced as a tactic to achieve im-
passe, not sufficiently scrutinizing regressive bargaining, and per-
mitting impasse to be reached after few bargaining sessions and in a
very short period."
84. See Bodah & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, supra note 58, at 10.
85. Some may ask what alternative should be adopted if implementation is
not the way to handle bargaining impasses. This suggests that implementation
is a credible way to resolve bargaining conflicts. Indeed, the entire idea is ab-
surd. Certainly, outside the area of collective bargaining, it would be unthink-
able to permit one party to dictate the terms of the parties' agreement. Why
should it be any different in collective bargaining? Taking away the right to
implement would move collective bargaining toward contract law in general.
Making it more difficult to reach impasse and, in particular, taking away the
reward of implementation for reaching impasse would make it more likely that
employers would have no alternative but to engage in real negotiating.
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Even taking a very conservative look at the data, they support a
conclusion that at least some employers have been using their ability
to implement final offers upon impasse with the goal of achieving
workplace hegemony and de-unionization. The data, moreover,
demonstrate that serious attention and further research is needed as to
the role implementation upon impasse plays in breaking down col-
lective bargaining and employee self-determination at all stages. Re-
search involving both surveys of negotiators and case studies of bar-
gaining are essential. Armed with greater information, we are
confident that all but those wholly opposed to unions and collective
bargaining will see the wisdom of replacing the doctrine of imple-
mentation upon impasse with a more reasonable way to resolve dis-
putes.
The preliminary analysis of these data lead to the conclusion
that labor law doctrine has advanced far down the wrong road, with
disastrous consequences for unions and workers. Certainly, devel-
oping Board law so that impasse was a mere description that says the
parties have reached a hard point in negotiations rather than making
it a goal to be achieved would go far to promote good faith bargain-
ing and achieve the purposes and policies of the NLRA. There are
important consequences to preventing the use of impasse as a tool to
de-unionize and to avoid the NLRA's bargaining obligation. Put an-
In trying to formulate alternatives, we know that there are only four key
ways to resolve impasses in bargaining- get the parties to agree, either by as-
sisting them through mediation or allowing them to work out their dispute by
their own means, such as by a strike or lockout; let the union impose its terms;
let the employer impose its terms; or let a neutral third party impose the terms,
as through interest arbitration. None of these alternatives but the first seems
wholly desirable. Allowing one side to implement is the antithesis of bargain-
ing. Allowing a third party to make the hard decisions may also destroy the
parties' relationship over time, although experience in the public sector may
make it possible to tinker with interest arbitration to avoid dependency on it by
making it difficult to trigger or by creating an arbitral process that forces the
parties to make their own agreement. The first and fourth alternatives certainly
have drawbacks. However, they are no worse than what now exists. As the
doctrine of employer implementation has taken root, it has created a lawless
labor law. Even employers with long-term successful partnerships with unions
may be unable to resist this powerful temptation. Employers with rocky rela-
tionships and those who have never accepted their employees' lawful choice to
unionize would be tempted to overthrow the employees' choice. This is not
the way the NLRA's drafters envisioned how collective bargaining would
function.
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other way, if it were more difficult to reach impasse and if employers
who reached impasse were not rewarded by being allowed to imple-
ment their final offers, employers might find it more attractive to ne-
gotiate an agreement. At the least, they would be less likely to see
negotiations as an anti-union tool as opposed to a means of codeter-
mining workplace conditions and defusing worker discontent. At a
minimum, to the extent it is more difficult to reach a bona fide im-
passe, more strikes would be unfair labor practice strikes and em-
ployers could not permanently replace the strikers. And at best, there
would be greater workplace harmony, increased productivity, and
improved wages and working conditions--the very goals the NLRA
was enacted to achieve.
86
IV. CONCLUSION
Decades ago, the NLRB took the first steps that led finally to the
current iteration of implementation upon impasse. Over the years,
the boundaries of the doctrine have expanded. It has now become so
embedded in practice that some argue it is a legitimate employer
economic weapon. However, when the doctrine is examined in the
context of the NLRA's purposes, it is easy to see it as a weapon-
and a powerful one-but difficult to see it as legitimate.
Taken together, the data on the proposals advanced and evi-
dence of employer views as to unions provide clear support for the
conclusion that anti-union sentiment is present among many employ-
ers, that many wish to de-unionize, and that many employers are
making proposals on issues they know are likely to lead to an im-
passe. Furthermore, in the overwhelming majority of cases in which
employers are declaring impasse no legal impasse exists. Putting
this all together suggests that impasse is indeed being used as a tool
to de-unionize. This means that the right of employers to implement
their final offers upon reaching impasse is a pernicious doctrine
which undercuts and even destroys workers' right to self-
determination by engaging in collective bargaining and must, there-
fore, be overturned.
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
